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ARTICLE
FOR-PROFIT RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS AND QUALIFYING FOR A
TITLE VII 702 EXEMPTION: EITHER REDEFINE ‘RELIGIOUS
CORPORATIONS’ OR BRING A RFRA ACTION
Anders Bengtson†
I. INTRODUCTION
Can a for-profit corporation qualify as a “religious corporation or
association” pursuant to section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Townley
held no, and courts have followed that precedent.1 Under the Townley test,
the “for-profit” factor has turned into a categorical bar regarding for-profit
corporations.2 The question then becomes whether the holding in Hobby
Lobby—that for-profit corporations have religious freedom rights—changed
the precedent and allows for-profit corporations, after meeting certain
qualifications, to be defined as religious.3
Section Two of this article presents hypothetical facts that illustrate the
need for “religious corporations or associations.”4 Section Three provides the
legal framework regarding the section 702 exemption of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, including an analysis of World Vision and Townley. Section Four
discusses the theory of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), how there is
an increased demand for CSR, and how religious corporations meet the
demand for CSR initiatives. Section Five analyzes Hobby Lobby by focusing
on the historical landscape of the separation of church and commerce
doctrine and the impact that Hobby Lobby made regarding religion in the
marketplace. Section Six addresses the clash between the religious freedom
rights of a corporation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finally,
Section Seven synthesizes the article for the business planning of a religious
corporation.
†
A.A. 2010, Southern State Community College; B.A. I.N.D.S. 2013, Liberty University;
M.B.A. 2017, Liberty University; J.D. 2020, Liberty University School of Law. The author
would like to thank Professor Rodney D. Chrisman for many discussions on business and
law and guidance on this article. The author would also like to thank his wife, Kathryn,
whom “[t]he heart of her husband trusts” above all others. Proverbs 31:11. Finally, the author
would like to thank Jesus Christ, the Lord of the Church and of all things.
1
EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615–16, 619 (9th Cir. 1988).
2
Id. at 619, 623; see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 716 (2014);
Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 734–35 (9th Cir. 2011).
3
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 690–91.
4
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
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II. A BUSINESS ON A MISSION
Beau is a business owner. Beau is also a Christian. While managing his
manufacturing business, he makes decisions that are in accord with his belief
system. Beau derives the foundation of his business from the framework set
forth by the Bible regarding Christian business owners.5 Beau aligns all
aspects of his business in a way that reflects his Christian beliefs. Therefore,
Beau’s marketing department advertises in a wholesome manner, the
products and services Beau offers add value to the consumer at a reasonable
price, Beau treats his employees fairly, and at times, Beau donates to the needs
of his employees out of his profits. Beau pays his employees for a thirtyminute devotional and prayer time once a week. Beau also donates a certain
percentage of his profits to his church and a Christian youth camp in his
hometown.
In order to ensure that his business continues to run in a way that reflects
his Christian beliefs, Beau only hires Christian managers. Beau believes
managers are the key employees that uphold and execute the Christian vision,
mission, and strategy of the business. Therefore, it is essential that Beau only
hire Christian managers to maintain the mission and culture of his company.
Yosef owns a bagel shop. Yosef is a practicing Jew. The mission of Yosef’s
bagel shop is to share his Jewish faith. Yosef’s bagel shop is completely kosher.
All of his employees follow strict guidelines to ensure that kosher standards
are met. Additionally, Yosef only orders from kosher suppliers. Yosef hires
students from the local synagogue to serve and engage his customers. His
goal is to create an environment and culture where the customers feel
comfortable talking to the servers about the important things in life. Yosef
hopes the servers will have an opportunity to share their faith. Yosef also
gives money from his bagel shop to the local Jewish community center. The
community center is a nonprofit organization. The center’s building is
physically connected to the synagogue; however, the center is managed and
staffed separately from the synagogue. Sharing his Jewish faith and giving to
the community center from his profits are essential to Yosef’s brand.
Yosef believes the best way to accomplish the mission of his business is to
hire only practicing Jews. He believes that employees who are Jewish will
understand the importance of a kosher environment. Practicing Jews are in
the best position to share the Jewish faith. Lastly, Yosef believes that only
hiring individuals who share his faith will create the type of culture that will
allow his business to flourish.

5

See generally JEFF VAN DUZER, WHY BUSINESS MATTERS TO GOD: AND WHAT STILL NEEDS

TO BE FIXED (2010).
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Jessica owns a yoga retreat center. Jessica does not subscribe to any
particular religion; however, she does believe that there is a cosmic energy
that can be accessed through different levels of consciousness. It is this
cosmic energy that Jessica uses to heal her clients during yoga sessions. Jessica
calls it spiritual yoga. From the moment Jessica’s clients come to the retreat
they feel a sense of this energy. The clients feel it through the décor,
landscaping, building architecture, and Jessica’s employees. Each employee
has experienced the cosmic energy and believes it can help all those that seek
it. Early on, Jessica decided to hire only people who have been healed by the
cosmic energy. She made this decision because she wanted to create an
environment that could best channel that cosmic energy. Jessica believes that
hiring only those healed by the energy can best accomplish that goal.
The business owner’s faith and religion are intrinsic to each of these three
hypothetical businesses (HBs). The faith of the business owner cannot be
separated from his or her HB. As opposed to merely making a profit, the
primary purposes for each of the HBs are sharing the owner’s faith and
creating a culture and environment where that faith can be experienced in
the marketplace.
Each HB has found success and just hired its fifteenth employee. The
business owners have no idea that they just stepped on a landmine that could
destroy the essence of why their businesses were created. By hiring its
fifteenth employee, each business has subjected itself to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the employers can no longer discriminate based on
religion.
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A.

Background: Civil Rights Act of 1964

In the face of serious national crises of racial tension, segregation, and
discrimination, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) to
address the discrimination occurring throughout the nation. The scope of the
CRA included voting rights, the desegregation of schools, and labor laws.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act dealt with employment law and applied to
employers with fifteen or more employees.6 One of the main purposes of Title
6
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Note, throughout this article and in practice, two citations are
used to refer to the same law: The Civil Rights Act of 1964. One citation refers to the United
States Code, and those references will refer to the Act as codified under Subchapter VI of
Chapter 21 of Title 42 of the United States Code (e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). The other
citation will refer to the specific section of the Civil Rights Acts as enacted (e.g., section 702
of the CRA, or simply referenced as “section 702,” “section 702 exemption,” or “702
exemption.”) See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964, https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-vii-civil-rights-act-1964 (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).

214

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:2

VII was to prevent employers from discriminating against certain protected
classes of people.7 Section 703 of the CRA states that it is unlawful for an
employer to discriminate based on an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”8 Congress intended to stop all employment
discrimination—not only discriminatory hiring practices, but also
discriminatory practices regarding firing, promotions, and other
opportunities.9
Congress also passed two exemptions to Title VII of the CRA.10 The first
was section 702, which created an organizational-wide exemption.11 The
section 702 exemption states:
This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society
with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by
such corporation, association, educational institution, or
society of its activities.12
This section 702 exemption only applies to a “religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society.”13 Congress reasoned that
religious organizations need to discriminate to fulfill their missions without
significant government interference.14 Religious organizations have a level of
autonomy apart from the jurisdiction of the government.15 The second
exemption that Congress created was a bona fide occupational qualification
exemption (BFOQ exception).16 The BFOQ exception allows employers to
discriminate regarding specific positions within an organization when there
is a bona fide need to discriminate.17 The courts created a third exception, the
ministerial exception, which allows churches to discriminate when hiring
7

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)–(b).
Id. at § 2000e-2(a).
9
See id. at § 2000e-2(d), (l).
10
See id. at §§ 2000e-1(a), 2000e-2(e).
11
Id. at § 2000e-1(a).
12
Id. (emphasis added).
13
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
14
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
15
See Angela C. Carmella, After Hobby Lobby: The “Religious For-Profit” and the Limits
of the Autonomy Doctrine, 80 MO. L. REV. 381, 381–82 (2015).
16
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
17
Id.
8
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ministers.18 Similar to the reasoning in the section 702 exemption, churches
have autonomy in their decisions, and churches must have the ability to
discriminate in their employment practices.19
B.

Applicable Law for the Hypothetical Businesses

Currently, Title VII of the CRA would apply to the HBs set out above
because they each employ fifteen employees. To discriminate, the HBs must
qualify for one of the three exemptions to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. First, the
ministerial exception does not apply because the HBs are not churches and
they are not hiring ministers. Second, the bona fide occupational
qualification does not apply. The BFOQ exception is very narrow and only
applies to specific positions within the organization that demand some
flexibility to achieve the normal operations of the business.20 Section
703(e)(1) of Title VII further explains the BFOQ exception: “an employer
may discriminate on the basis of ‘religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise.’”21 Additionally, the BFOQ exception
is not an organization-wide exemption but a position-specific exemption.22
The HBs’ owners need an organization-wide exemption, not just a positional
exemption.
Since the ministerial and BFOQ exceptions do not apply, the best
opportunity for the HBs is to qualify for the 702 exemption. In other words,
each HB must be defined as a “religious corporation” or a “religious
association.” The following is an analysis of the current status of the 702
exemption and who qualifies for the 702 exemption.
C.

Scope of 702 Exemption

Courts struggle to define the scope of the section 702 exemption. Two of
the main issues courts wrestle with are how to define religious organizations
and how to determine when the section 702 exemption applies to a religious

18

EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 581 (6th Cir. 2018),
aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020); see also HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).
19
Carmella, supra note 15, at 381–82.
20
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991).
21
Id. at 200 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)).
22
Id. at 201.
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organization.23 Courts have no trouble applying the exemption to churches.24
Outside of the context of a church, courts find it difficult to determine when
to apply the exemption. The following case is an example of how the courts
extend the definition of religious organization beyond a church.
1.

Spencer v. World Vision, Inc.

In World Vision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the scope of
a “religious corporation, association, . . . or society” pursuant to the section
702 exemption of the Civil Rights Act.25 The employees of World Vision
brought a complaint against World Vision for religious employment
discrimination.26 World Vision is a Christian, faith-based, humanitarian
nonprofit organization “dedicated to working with children, families and
their communities worldwide to reach their full potential by tackling the
causes of poverty and injustice.”27 World Vision was a “parachurch”
organization, meaning it had a religious purpose but was not closely tied to a
particular church or churches.28 As a condition of employment, employees
submitted a personal statement that “acknowledged their ‘agreement and
compliance’ with World Vision’s Statement of Faith, Core Values, and
Mission Statement.”29 The employees who brought the complaint were
terminated after the employers discovered that the employees were not
following the Statement of Faith of the organization.30
The court was tasked with determining whether World Vision fit into the
category of a “religious corporation, association, . . . or society” pursuant to
the section 702 exemption.31 Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain pointed out that
each organizational exemption must be decided “on a case-by-case basis” by
analyzing “whether the ‘general picture’ of an organization is ‘primarily
religious,’ taking into account ‘[a]ll significant religious and secular
characteristics.’”32 The analysis should not simply “march down a checklist

23

See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 725–27 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain,
J., concurring); EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 613, 618 (9th Cir. 1988).
24
World Vision, 633 F.3d at 725–27 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
25
Id. at 725.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 732.
29
Id. at 725.
30
World Vision, 633 F.3d at 725 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
31
Id.
32
Id. at 729 (quoting EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir.
1988)).
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of considerations”—because each case is factually different.33 World Vision
was different than other cases; therefore, the factors that applied in other
cases did not apply here.34
The court laid out a rule for when an organization meets the section 702
exemption. Under Judge O’Scannlain’s test, an organization was exempted if
it established that it “1) is organized for a self-identified religious purpose (as
evidenced by Articles of Incorporation or similar foundational documents),
2) is engaged in activity consistent with, and in furtherance of, those religious
purposes, and 3) holds itself out to the public as religious.”35 Judge
O’Scannlain reasoned that this test minimized the need for a court to inquire
about “whether an activity is religious or secular in nature.”36
Judge O’Scannlain determined that an important factor was whether the
organization was a non-profit.37 He reasoned that nonprofit organizations
operate for non-pecuniary interests, as the net earnings are not distributed to
the people with a personal interest in the organization but remain in the
organization to achieve its purposes.38 He also reasoned that not distributing
its net earnings is an indication that “an entity is not operated simply in order
to generate revenues . . . but that the activities themselves are infused with a
religious purpose.”39 Requiring an organization to hold itself out as religious
“‘helps to ensure that only bona fide religious institutions are exempted.’”40
Judge O’Scannlain ultimately concluded that the “general picture” of
World Vision was “primarily religious” and therefore qualified for the
section 702 exemption.41 He reasoned that World Vision was a nonprofit
whose humanitarian operations flowed from its religious purpose.42 World
Vision operated in a manner consistent with its founding documents, which
explained that it was a religious organization.43
In his concurrence, Judge Kleinfeld provided his analysis of the rule for a
section 702 exemption.44 Judge Kleinfeld argued that the test Judge
33

Id.
Id. at 729–30.
35
Id. at 734.
36
World Vision, 633 F.3d at 734 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 344 (1987)).
40
Id. at 735 (quoting Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
41
Id. at 741.
42
World Vision, 633 F.3d at 741 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring).
43
Id.
44
See id. at 741 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
34
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O’Scannlain created was too broad.45 He argued that under Judge
O’Scannlain’s test, the manufacturing plant from Townley would meet the
exemption if it registered as a nonprofit under section 501(c)(3) and
continued operations.46 Judge Kleinfeld also rebutted Judge Berzon’s test laid
out in the dissenting opinion.47 According to Judge Kleinfeld, Judge Berzon
limited the section 702 application because “Congress used the terms
‘religious corporation, association . . . or society’ . . . to describe a church or
other group organized for worship, religious study, or the dissemination of
religious doctrine.”48 Therefore, under a Judge Berzon analysis, anything that
is not considered a church or other group organized for worship, religious
study, or the dissemination of religious doctrine does not receive the § 702
exemption.
While Judge Berzon argued that World Vision did not fit within this
category, Judge Kleinfeld noted that, under Judge Berzon’s test, even Mother
Teresa’s works would not fit under the exemption.49 Judge Kleinfeld
reformulated the test as follows:
To determine whether an entity is a “religious corporation,
association, or society,” determine whether it is organized
for a religious purpose, is engaged primarily in carrying out
that religious purpose, holds itself out to the public as an
entity for carrying out that religious purpose, and does not
engage primarily or substantially in the exchange of goods
or services for money beyond nominal amounts.50
Judge Kleinfeld argued that the exemption should apply only to nonprofits
who hold services out to the general public without charge.51 He compared
the Salvation Army with a hypothetical hospital that is connected with a
church.52 The Salvation Army is most similar to a church because it does good
works for its religion and holds those good works out for free.53 Therefore,
the Salvation Army is entitled to discriminate and the hypothetical hospital
is not.54 Judge Kleinfeld argued that a hospital connected with a church has
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 742.
Id. at 745.
Id.
World Vision, 633 F.3d at 742 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
Id. at 744.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 746–47.
Id.
See World Vision, 633 F.3d at 746–47 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
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no grounds to discriminate based on religion or for any reason. Because the
hospital would be compensated for its services, it should not receive an
exemption.55
Ultimately, the court had little trouble holding that World Vision met the
section 702 exemption because it was a nonprofit and had a religious
mission.56 In the next case, Townley, the court analyzed the section 702
exemption for a for-profit company and did not apply the exemption to the
manufacturing company.57
2.

EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co.

In Townley, the majority owners (holding 94% of the shares) of a closelyheld manufacturing corporation (Townley) were devout Christians.58 The
business owners, Jake and Helen Townley, made a covenant with God that
their “business ‘would be a Christian, faith-operated business.’”59 The
Townleys were “‘born again believers in the Lord Jesus Christ’ who ‘[were]
unable to separate God from any portion of their daily lives, including their
activities at the Townley company.’”60 As part of their covenant with God, the
Townleys mandated that all employees attend a thirty-to-forty-five-minute
weekly devotional service.61 The service included prayer, Bible reading, and
singing.62 Not attending the service was the equivalent of being absent from
work.63 An employee policy handbook was created and passed out to all the
employees, which mandated all employees attend the devotional services.64
An employee of Townley filed a religious discrimination complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).65 The employee,
an atheist, did not want to attend the devotional meetings.66 After denying a
transfer, the employee argued that he was constructively discharged from the
company.67 The EEOC then filed a complaint against Townley.68
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id. at 746–47.
Id. at 741 (majority opinion).
See generally EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 611–12.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
Townley, 859 F.2d at 612.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The EEOC claimed that Townley violated section 703(a) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.69 The district court ruled in favor of two of the employee’s
summary judgment motions, and Townley promptly appealed.70 The Ninth
Circuit held, inter alia, that section 702’s exemption did not apply to a forprofit corporation.71
The first issue the court addressed was the definition of a “religious
corporation.”72 The court looked to the legislative history of the bill; however,
it found little help in defining the term.73 After analyzing case law, the court
stated that case law also did not help settle the definition of a religious
corporation.74 However, even without a definition of “religious corporation,”
the court acknowledged that “[i]n most cases, the defendant is clearly a
‘religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society’ within
the meaning of section 702 of the statute.”75 The court concluded that the fact
that most of the defendants were “clearly religious” “demonstrate[s] that the
central function of section 702 has been to exempt churches, synagogues, and
the like, and organizations closely affiliated with those entities.”76
The court did not discuss the scope of the section 702 exemption in
Townley but rather held that each case “turn[s] on its own facts” and “[a]ll
significant religious and secular characteristics must be weighed to determine
whether the corporation’s purpose and character are primarily religious.
Only when that is the case will the corporation be able to avail itself of the
exemption.”77 To meet the section 702 exemption, the organization must
meet a “primarily religious” standard.78 The court then analyzed the different
factors to determine whether an organization is “primarily religious” or
secular.79
The court held the following factors lean in favor of an organization being
secular: (1) the organization is for-profit, (2) the organization produces a
secular product, (3) the organization is not affiliated with or supported by a
church, and (4) the articles of incorporation of the organization do not
69

Townley, 859 F.2d at 612.
Id.
71
Id. at 613.
72
Id. at 617.
73
Id. at 617–18 (discussing the legislative history that did not clarify the definition of
religious corporations).
74
Id. at 618.
75
Townley, 859 F.2d at 618.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 618–19.
79
Id. at 619.
70
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mention any religious purpose.80 The court held the following factors lean in
favor of an organization being religious: (1) the organization’s marketing
includes a religious message, (2) the organization financially supports other
religious entities, (3) the organization holds weekly devotional services, and
(4) the organization’s owners actively disciple others for the Lord Jesus
Christ.81 The court ultimately held that the company was secular, reasoning
that the “beliefs of the owners and operators of a corporation are simply not
enough in themselves to make the corporation ‘religious’ within the meaning
of section 702.”82
The second issue the Townley court considered was Townley’s argument
that Title VII violated its rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.83 The court held that a company does not have Free Exercise
rights under the First Amendment and that a company has “no rights of its
own different from or greater than its owners’ rights.”84 The court reasoned
that the company is “merely the instrument through and by which Mr. and
Mrs. Townley express their religious beliefs.”85
The final issue the court considered was whether Townley’s employee
policy violated Title VII.86 The employee policy required all employees to
attend the devotional services.87 Townley argued that it was entitled to invoke
the Free Exercise Clause to uphold the employee policy.88 The court applied
a test similar to strict scrutiny in weighing three factors:
(1) the magnitude of the statute’s impact on the exercise of a
religious belief; (2) the existence of a compelling state
interest justifying the burden imposed upon the exercise of
the religious belief; and (3) the extent to which recognition
of an exemption from the statute would impede objectives
sought to be advanced by the statute.89

80

See id.
See Townley, 859 F.2d at 619.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 619–20. Contra Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 708-13 (2014)
(Hobby Lobby abrogated this portion of Townley, but the decision was based on a RFRA
action and did not mention Townley in the opinion.).
85
Townley, 859 F.2d at 619.
86
Id. at 613.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 619.
89
Id. at 620 (quoting EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir.
1986)).
81
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The court ultimately held that the devotional services were not a violation of
Title VII; however, Townley’s mandate that employees who objected to the
devotional services must attend the services was a violation.90 The court held
that Townley must accommodate the employees who objected to the
employment practice.91 The court reasoned that “Congress’ purpose to end
discrimination is equally if not more compelling than other interests that
have been held to justify legislation that burdened the exercise of religious
convictions.”92
D.

Section 702 and the Hypothetical Businesses

Under this current case law, the HB owners would not qualify for a section
702 exemption. Therefore, those business owners could not discriminate
based on race, sex, nationality, or religion.93 Townley and World Vision make
it clear that a for-profit corporation does not qualify for the section 702
exemption because a for-profit corporation is not a “religious corporation or
association.”94 Thus, because the HBs are for-profit companies, they would
not qualify for the exemption.
The inability to discriminate based on religion poses a threat to the essence
of the HBs’ missions. The HBs’ entire value proposition is based on a specific
religion, and the owners believe it is best to only hire employees of their
particular faith. These HB owners are not in isolation. As explained in the
next section, the rise of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has shifted the
thinking of many business owners from profit maximization to social
responsibility. When the CSR initiative of the business owner is a religious
value proposition, the business owner’s impact on society will be greatly
limited.
IV. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
Social programs, including those implemented by governments and
NGOs, cannot compete with the ability of the private sector to donate

90

Id. at 613.
Townley, 859 F.2d at 621; see also Loren F. Selznick, Running Mom and Pop Businesses
by the Good Book: The Scope of Religious Rights of Business Owners, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1353,
1381 (2014); Dallan F. Flake, Image Is Everything: Corporate Branding and Religious
Accommodation in the Workplace, 163 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 699, 700 (2015) (discussing
employer accommodation of employee religious rights).
92
Townley, 859 F.2d at 620 (quoting EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272,
1280 (9th Cir. 1982)).
93
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
94
See generally Townley, 859 F.2d 611; Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723 (9th
Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
91
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resources towards a social good through a company’s CSR initiatives.95 The
social good a company can do is not just about the products that a company
produces, but also about the company’s entire value proposition through
CSR.
CSR is defined as a private, profit-making enterprise that voluntarily
engages in activities other than profit maximization to benefit the society in
which it operates.96 All companies are bound by certain legal thresholds, and
CSR activities “exceed[] [those] obligatory, legally enforced thresholds.”97
CSR is a predominant force in the modern marketplace. Many companies
view their CSR initiatives as a competitive advantage.98
The idea that private entities should engage in activities other than profit
maximization has been a topic of great discussion in firms, academia,
business schools, and judicial opinions. In Dodge v. Ford Motor Company,
the Michigan Supreme Court analyzed Henry Ford’s decision to give $60
million of the company’s profits to charitable organizations rather than a
dividend to the shareholders.99 In the early 1900s, the Dodge court held that
the purpose of a company is for profit-maximization, and therefore, a
company could not distribute the profits to a social good.100 Modern courts
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Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 78, 83 (2006).
96
Arvind K. Jain, Corporate Social Responsibility, in 2 INT’L ENCYC. OF THE SOC. SCI. 136,
136–38 (William A. Darity, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2008).
97
Markus Kitzmueller, Economics and Corporate Social Responsibility, in 21ST CENTURY
ECON.: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 785, 786 (Rhona C. Free ed., 2010).
98
Porter & Kramer, supra note 95, at 91.
99
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
100
Id. at 684.
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have abandoned this Friedman approach to corporate economics101 and
would not overturn a decision to distribute profits to a social program.102
101
See Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice, 12 INT’L J. OF MGMT. REV. 85
(2010). Milton Friedman was an economist who promoted free markets and capitalism and
was concerned with the rise of corporate social responsibility. Friedman opposed CSR on
five points: (1) Governments have the duty to solve social issues, free markets and firms
working within those markets are not able to solve social issues; (2) managers are not trained
in solving social issues, rather they are best at making money; (3) CSR would “dilute[]
businesses’ primary purpose” of profit maximization; (4) businesses already have enough
power and that establishing power in the social sector would be harmful for society as a
whole; (5) CSR would make firms less competitive globally. Id. at 88.
See also IAN MAITLAND, PROFIT MAXIMIZATION, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, 4
ENCYC. OF BUS. ETHICS AND SOC’Y 1696 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2008). Friedman’s objections
raised great discussion and debate not only regarding corporate social responsibility but also
the very essence for the purpose of businesses. Friedman argued that managers “have
accepted a fiduciary obligation to manage the corporation in accordance with the desires of
its owners, and CSR would permit or require them to violate that obligation.” Id. at 1697.
From Friedman’s perspective, public companies that gave to CSR initiatives would do so
without the consent of the owners. Id. While Friedman argued against firms engaging in
CSR, he made a delineation between a firm giving to CSR and people making personalprivate donations. Friedman argued that the purpose of business is profit maximization and
did not see a correlation between giving to CSR and maximizing profits. However, he stated
that he saw nothing wrong with people giving their own money to social initiatives. That is a
personal and private matter, unlike a public company giving to a CSR initiative. Id.
A break-through in CSR answered Friedman’s contentions when it was realized that CSR
may lead to profit maximization. See KITZMUELLER, supra note 97, at 785. Research indicates
that there are “no necessary trade-offs between profitability in terms of financial
performance and responsibility, even explicitly socially beneficial activities.” SANDRA
WADDOCK, STRATEGIC CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, 4 ENCYC. OF BUS. ETHICS AND
SOC’Y 2007–08 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 2008). Firms realized that CSR initiatives were a
demand shifter within the marketplace. Therefore, engaging in CSR activities and properly
marketing those activities would increase company profits. See KITZMUELLER, supra note 97,
at 791.
Friedman argued that firms should not engage in CSR if the firm’s shareholders are
unaware of the activity. See MAITLAND, supra, at 1696–97. Firms soon realized that CSR
would not only attract customers but also shareholders. One step further is that firms could
take an economic loss in the CSR initiative because it will lead to shareholder value
maximization. See KITZMUELLER, supra note 97, at 787.
Four primary benefits of CSR are: (1) cost and risk reduction; firms reduce costs and risks
by engaging in “environmentally responsible commitments [that] enhance long-term
shareholder value.” See Carroll & Shabana, supra, at 95, 97. Firms also find tax incentives. Id.
at 97. (2) CSR can be a competitive advantage. Firms may target specific social causes that
would bring the most profit maximization or shareholder maximization; (3) Reputation and
legitimacy Id. at 95. Legitimacy is defined as a “generalized perception or assumption that
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy:

2021]

RELIGIOUS TITLE VII EXEMPTIONS

225

Distributing corporate profits to social programs benefits society.103
Unfortunately, leaders from both spheres often see competing interests
rather than harmony.104 Healthy societies meet the basic needs of their
citizens through higher education standards, health care, equal opportunity,
and a just government. As the basic needs of life are fulfilled, the standard of
living increases and businesses meet the demand of a higher standard of
living.105 Society needs businesses. Porter and Kramer expressed society’s
need for business when they argued that “[n]o social program can rival the
business sector when it comes to creating the jobs, wealth, and innovation
that improve standards of living and social conditions over time.”106
Corporate social responsibility is the catalyst to bridging the gap between the
interests of society and the interests of a business.107 By focusing on shared
value through CSR initiatives, businesses and society will mutually
flourish.108
Over half of state legislatures have adopted the Model Benefit Corporation
Act, acknowledging the social benefits a business can make in the
surrounding communities.109 A benefit corporation is an entirely new type of
business entity.110 The advantage of a benefit corporation is that the fiduciary
duties of a typical corporate fiduciary are adjusted to meet the purpose of the

Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20 ACAD. OF MGMT. J., 571, 574 (1995). As the
legitimacy of the firm increases in the perception of the consumer, a “mutualistic”
relationship is developed between the firm and the consumer. See Carroll & Shabana, supra,
at 99. This is partly because the firm has become a valued member in society through its
socially beneficial initiatives; (4) Synergistic value creation. Id. at 95, 100. “The win-win
perspective to CSR practices is aimed at satisfying stakeholders’ demands while, at the same
time, allowing the firm to pursue its operations.” Id. at 100. The company’s operations can
continue and earn profits while accomplishing the shareholder’s demands for socially
beneficial initiatives. See also Porter & Kramer, supra note 95, at 83 (discussing best practices
to incorporate a CSR strategy within a firm.).
102
Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, Sustainable Business, 62 EMORY L.J. 851, 868 (2013).
103
Porter & Kramer, supra note 95, at 83.
104
See VAN DUZER, supra note 5 (discussing the benefits of business to society and
arguing that a correct theology of business can add value to all stakeholders of the business).
105
Porter & Kramer, supra note 95, at 83.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 83–84.
108
Id. at 84.
109
State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP.,
https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Feb. 5, 2021); see also
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 712–13 (2014).
110
FREDERICK H. ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND GOVERNANCE: PURSUING
PROFIT WITH PURPOSE 64 (2018).
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benefit corporation.111 Unlike corporations, where the fiduciaries are bound
to maximizing shareholder wealth as the sole purpose of the corporation,
benefit corporation fiduciaries are bound to achieving the purposes of the
corporation as defined in the articles of incorporation.112 The purpose must
be beneficial to society.113 Fiduciaries are charged with accomplishing that
purpose, namely a benefit to society.114
The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation demonstrates a foundational
shift in the way people think about corporations. This shift in corporate law
is from a shareholder value maximization view to a stakeholder value
maximization view. The benefit corporation is another indication of the rise
of CSR and demand in the marketplace for companies that are seeking more
than just a profit.
A.

Business, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Religion

TOMS Shoes is an example of a company whose entire business model is
based on a CSR value proposition.115 When TOMS Shoes first started, it gave
a pair of shoes away for every pair of shoes purchased.116 This value
proposition was an essential element of TOMS Shoes’ business model.117 Its
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 70.
Id. at 22, 70.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Impact, TOMS SHOES, https://www.toms.com/us/impact.html (last visited Feb. 22,

2021).
116
TOMS and Save the Children, SAVE THE CHILDREN,
https://www.savethechildren.org/us/about-us/become-a-partner/corporations/toms (last
visited Feb. 22, 2021). (“Known for their casual shoes and commitment to giving and
innovation, TOMS operates a One for One™ model. For every pair of TOMS shoes
purchased, a pair of new shoes is given to a child in need in partnership with humanitarian
organizations.”).
117
Lucy Handley, This Entrepreneur Set Out to Do Good over Making Money, but Still
Earned Hundreds of Millions of Dollars. CNBC, (Oct. 4, 2018, 11:09 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/04/blake-mycoskie-of-toms-shoes-set-out-to-do-good--andmade-millions.html (“‘I recognized in that question [who is going to give the next pair of
shoes to impoverished children?] that [] the problem with this kind of nonprofit charitable
giving model, at least . . . these women had to spend weeks getting enough shoes that would
last these kids for a few months,’ Mycoskie told ‘The Brave Ones.’
Then he had an idea. ‘What if I sold these really cool shoes that I had only seen in
Argentina to my friends back in California, and every time I sold a pair, I would also make
another pair to give to one of these kids? It just seemed like the simplest idea in the world,’
he said. . . . ‘We literally had created karma, if you will, by, you know, really setting out to do
something to help people versus just trying to make money,’ Mycoskie said.
He has since launched a social entrepreneurship fund, investing in purpose-driven, forprofit companies.”).
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value proposition was the very essence of the business’s existence.118 From
the owner’s perspective, there is no reason for the business to exist in the
absence of that value proposition.119
Two of the HBs used models that were entirely based on a CSR value
proposition. The religious essence of Beau’s manufacturing plant was to run
the manufacturing plant in a way that honored God. The bottom line of
Beau’s business was not profit maximization, but rather running the
manufacturing plant in accordance with the Bible. Therefore, some of Beau’s
decisions negatively affected the financial bottom line. Out of the company
profits, Beau gave to his employees, church, and church camps. Instead of
simply breaching a contract and paying the damages to engage with a
different vendor, Beau seriously considered the promises he made with his
vendors and others with whom he was in privity of contract. Similarly,
Yosef’s mission was to share his Jewish faith. He hired students from the local
synagogue to be servers and share their faith. Additionally, he only purchased
from kosher suppliers. The entire essence of these businesses was their CSR
initiatives through the practice of the business owner’s religion.
Jessica’s business model was not a CSR value proposition. However,
similar to all the HBs, Jessica had a religious value proposition. The money
spent on the landscaping, décor, and interior design contributed to her brand
and religious value proposition. Jessica spent extra money to create an
environment that maximized the cosmic energy for her clients. However,
Jessica had no activities that extended beyond the walls of her business into
society. The religious component would not be profit-maximizing;
nevertheless, CSR requires an element of societal contribution beyond the
business’s products or services provided.
The religious CSR initiatives and value propositions of the HBs are
essential and important to those businesses, just as the CSR initiatives are
essential and important to TOMS Shoes. The religious value proposition is
the very essence of the HBs’ existence. Additionally, those CSR initiatives
would provide a societal value. However, current law impedes each of the
HBs’ value propositions because the law does not allow religious business
owners to discriminate in their employment practices.

118

Id.
Id. (“[We] really set[] out to do something to help people versus just trying to make
money.”); see also, Impact, TOMS SHOES, https://www.toms.com/us/impact.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2021) (TOMS Shoes is a Certified B Corporation indicating that the company must
have a social purpose other than a sole purpose of making profits.).
119
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V. HOBBY LOBBY AND THE EXERCISE OF RELIGION THROUGH A BUSINESS
A.

History of Religion in the Marketplace

The following is an excerpt that discusses the historical context of Hobby
Lobby regarding a “religious” free marketplace.
Prior to the 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., a separation of church and commerce doctrine
was developing unabated in federal and state courts. As
United States Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. put it
at the Hobby Lobby argument: “[O]nce you make a choice to
go into the commercial sphere, . . . you are making a choice
to live by the rules that govern you and your competitors in
the commercial sphere.”
In other words, business owners were free to practice
religion on their own time, but when they entered the
commercial world, faith had to bow to secular law.
The Hobby Lobby case, construing the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, put an end to the notion of a
nationally imposed, religion-free commercial zone. State
and local zones, however, are a different matter.
....
Religious freedom and tolerance are imbedded in the
American psyche. Students begin learning about the history
and tradition as early as nursery school and kindergarten
when they are taught about the Thanksgiving holiday. While
Americans have generally accepted the concept of
separation of church and state, the government and some
interest groups have pressed for a separation between
church and private business as well.
The concept would have been inconceivable to the
Pilgrims and Puritans who escaped England seeking the
freedom to live by their religious principles. When they
came to North America, the Puritans sought the freedom to
practice their religious faith “by applying the doctrines and
commandments of the Bible to every detail of life,” including
their commercial dealings. Puritanism was practiced
primarily through day-to-day conduct and public action
rather than “through sacred symbol” or “the glories or the
pomps of art.” The “emphasis” was “on serving the Lord in
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one's vocation—as a tradesman, as a merchant, as an artisan,
or as a magistrate or ‘citizen.’” The Quakers, too, established
themselves in business by conducting their commercial
enterprises in accordance with religious principles.
The Founders of the United States over a century later
recognized the role of religion in commercial
pursuits. Thomas Jefferson said: “[Th]ose who labour in the
earth are the chosen people of God . . . . It is the focus in
which he keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might
escape from the face of the earth.” Benjamin Franklin said,
“God governs in the Affairs of Men.”
Between the Revolution and the Civil War, the United
States became home to a number of religious communal
movements in which religious rule ordered every facet of
life, including the economy and the family. Individuals
spiritually rooted in the Great Awakening cleansed their
own homes and their businesses of slavery. “As long as
slavery survived, how could the awakened know a true
millennium, and how could the enlightened truly speak of
the pursuit of happiness.”
In the nineteenth century, it was commonplace for
American businesses to integrate religious or moral
philosophy into business practices and this continued into
the early 1900s. Concern about working conditions during
the Industrial Revolution led preachers to remind
proprietors to carry the faith to work. Minister Washington
Gladden noted in the late nineteenth century that it was “the
primary business of Christianity to define and regulate” the
“relations of man to man,” rejecting the argument that “his
function [was] the saving of souls and not the regulation of
business.”
By the mid-twentieth century, however, a different
approach emerged, that “religion should, for the most part,
be zoned out of the marketplace and market relations,” and
this view took hold in the law itself. “The desirability of a
religiously neutral workplace received legal manifestation
with the passage of Title VII in 1964.”
Today, many American businesses—particularly small
mom-and-pop enterprises—have rejected this trend and
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attempted to operate their daily transactions in accordance
with religious beliefs, viewing “religion not as one isolated
aspect of human existence but rather as a comprehensive
system more or less present in all domains of the individual’s
life.” There has been “a religious awakening of sorts, which
has spawned a new breed of religiously serious executives,
investors, employees, and customers, all of whom are pulling
many business corporations toward a more faith-infused
model.”120
B.

Introduction: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.

The central question in Hobby Lobby was “Do business owners give up the
right to free exercise at the door of the shop?”121 “This idea—often posited by
the government—has had some success in the courts, but Hobby Lobby
expressly disposed of it at the federal level.”122 Hobby Lobby was brought to
the Supreme Court of the United States by three companies, Conestoga
Wood Specialties (“Conestoga”), Hobby Lobby, and Mardel.123 Conestoga
was started by Norman Hahn and was solely owned by Norman, his wife, and
three sons (collectively, “the Hahns”).124 The Hahns were devout members of
the Mennonite Church.125 Additionally, as sole owners of Conestoga, they
sought to “run their business ‘in accordance with their religious beliefs and
moral principles.’”126 Embodied in their mission was a desire to “‘operate in
a professional environment founded upon the highest ethical, moral, and
Christian principles.’”127 Additionally, “[t]he company’s ‘Vision and Values
Statements’ affirm[] that Conestoga endeavors to ‘ensur[e] a reasonable
profit in [a] manner that reflects [the Hahns’] Christian heritage.’”128
Conestoga was very successful and had 950 employees.129

120

Selznick, supra note 91, at 1353–57 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1387 (footnotes omitted); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682, 688 (2014).
122
Selznick, supra note 91, at 1387 (footnotes omitted).
123
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 701, 703–04.
124
Id. at 700–01.
125
Id. at 700.
126
Id. at 701 (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394,
402 (E.D. Pa. 2013)).
127
Id. (quoting Conestoga, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 402).
128
Id. at 701.
129
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 700.
121
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Hobby Lobby was owned and operated by the Green family, David and
Barbara Green and their three children.130 Hobby Lobby was an arts and craft
store.131 One of the Greens’ sons started Mardel, which was a Christian
bookstore.132 Each business was a success, with Hobby Lobby having 13,000
employees and 500 stores, and Mardel having 400 employees and 35 stores.133
The Green family was a Christian family and sought to practice their faith
through their business endeavors.134
Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose commits the Greens
to “[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating the
company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”
Each family member has signed a pledge to run the
businesses in accordance with the family’s religious beliefs
and to use the family assets to support Christian ministries.
In accordance with those commitments, Hobby Lobby and
Mardel stores close on Sundays, even though the Greens
calculate that they lose millions in sales annually by doing
so. The businesses refuse to engage in profitable transactions
that facilitate or promote alcohol use; they contribute profits
to Christian missionaries and ministries; and they buy
hundreds of full-page newspaper ads inviting people to
“know Jesus as Lord and Savior.”135
All three companies brought a claim against the federal government,
different federal agencies, and federal officers under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).136 The Hahns and Greens believed that life
begins at conception.137 The Hahns went so far as to add a board resolution
for the company that stated that life began at conception.138 The idea that life
begins at conception was an integral tenant of the families’ faith.139 The
federal government mandated that the companies provide medical insurance
for their employees that provided for certain contraceptives that violated the

130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 702.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 702–03.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 703 (citations omitted).
Id. at 703–04.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 701.
Id.
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companies’ religious tenants; namely, that life begins at conception.140
Therefore, the companies brought this lawsuit.141 The companies argued that
the insurance policies were a violation of their religious freedom.142
The Court first analyzed whether RFRA can apply to for-profit
corporations.143 The United States Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) made three arguments against applying RFRA: (1) the term
“persons” does not include for-profit entities; (2) for-profit entities cannot
exercise religion; and (3) RFRA was a codification of the Supreme Court’s
pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause precedent, and because “none of those cases
squarely held that a for-profit corporation has free-exercise rights, RFRA
does not confer such protection.”144 “RFRA prohibits the ‘[g]overnment
[from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability’ unless the Government
‘demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’”145
First, regarding “persons,” the Court held that “persons” encompassed a
for-profit, closely-held corporation.146 The Court noted that Congress did not
define ‘persons’ in RFRA, and therefore, referenced the Dictionary Act where
“persons” was defined to include “corporations, companies, associations,
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.”147 The Court made an analogy by referencing the Fourth
Amendment.148 The term “persons” under the Fourth Amendment was
expanded to include corporations and therefore gave corporations certain
rights against searches and seizures.149 Additionally, the Court has
entertained RFRA and free-exercise claims brought by nonprofits as the
nonprofits fit within the term of “persons.”150 The Court stated that “no
conceivable definition of the term [persons] includes natural persons and
nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations. . . . To give the same

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 688.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 688.
Id. at 703–04.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 707–13.
Id. at 682 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b)).
Id. at 706–08.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 707–08.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id. at 708.
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words a different meaning for each category would be to invent a statute
rather than interpret one.”151 The Court emphasized the point that for-profit
corporations are included in the term ‘persons’.152
The Court then addressed the argument that for-profit companies cannot
exercise a religion.153 The Court held that a for-profit entity could exercise
religion.154 The Court reasoned that non-profit organizations have a
corporate form and have the right to exercise religion.155 Therefore, a forprofit corporation’s corporate form alone is not sufficient to conclude that
the for-profit corporation does not have the right to exercise religion.156 The
Court analogized this to the sole proprietorship recognized in Braunfeld.157
In Braunfeld, the Court recognized that the compulsory nature of a
regulation on a sole proprietor can be a burden on the exercise of religion.158
The profit-making nature of an entity also does not prohibit the right to
exercise the religion of that entity.159 The Court stated: “If, as Braunfeld
recognized, a sole proprietorship that seeks to make a profit may assert a freeexercise claim, why can’t Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel do the
same?”160 The Court also pointed to the fact that most state corporate statutes
say that a corporation may be organized for “any lawful purpose,” and in
many cases today, that lawful purpose is something more than just profit.161
A corporation is such an example where “over half of the States, for instance,
now recognize the ‘benefit corporation,’ a dual-purpose entity that seeks to
achieve both a benefit for the public and a profit for its owners.”162
Regarding the ability of a corporation to exercise religion, the Court
concluded:
[T]he “exercise of religion” involves “not only belief and
profession but the performance of (or abstention from)
physical acts” that are “engaged in for religious reasons.”
Business practices that are compelled or limited by the tenets
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Id. at 708–09 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
Id.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 709.
Id. at 709–10.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 710; see also Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 709–10.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 712–13; see discussion supra Section IV.
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of a religious doctrine fall comfortably within that
definition. Thus, a law that “operates so as to make the
practice of . . . religious beliefs more expensive” in the
context of business activities imposes a burden on the
exercise of religion.163
Finally, the Court addressed HHS’s argument that RFRA should not apply
to this case because RFRA was the codification of pre-Smith cases, and none
of those cases squarely held that corporations have free exercise rights.164 The
Court reasoned that nothing in the statute suggested that RFRA was the
codification of pre-Smith cases.165 Second, Congress amended RFRA in a way
that indicated it did not intend to stay closely tied with the pre-Smith cases.166
Third, when Congress wanted to exclude for-profit companies, it explicitly
did so.167 The Court finally concluded that RFRA did apply to federal
regulation restrictions of closely-held, for-profit corporations.168
After the Court determined that RFRA applied, it then determined
whether the HHS contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the
companies’ exercise of religion.169 The Court held that it had “little trouble in
concluding that it [did].”170 First, the mandate would force the Greens and
their companies to violate their religious beliefs.171 Second, the mandate
would force the companies to pay enormous sums of money for not abiding
by the regulation.172 Hobby Lobby, for instance, would have to pay an extra
$475 million per year if it wanted to provide insurance in accordance with its
religious beliefs.173
The Court then considered whether “HHS ha[d] shown that the mandate
both ‘(1) [was] in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)
[was] the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.’”174
First, regarding a compelling governmental interest, HHS contended that the

163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
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173
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Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 710 (citations omitted).
Id. at 713.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 719.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 719.
Id.
Id. at 720.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 726 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)).
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contraceptive mandates served an important governmental interest.175 The
Court conceded this point; however, it noted that the interests were couched
in the interests of public health and gender equality.176
The Court next considered whether the mandate was the least restrictive
means of furthering the government's compelling interest.177 The Court
ultimately held that the burden had not been met.178 The Court reasoned that
there were two means to accomplish the government’s interest: (1) the
government could pay for the contraceptives, or (2) the same
accommodation given to non-profits could be given to these companies.179
The Court ultimately held that the contraceptive measures were a violation
of the families’ and companies’ free exercise of religion right and could not
be upheld.180
C.

Hobby Lobby Opened the Door for Religious Businesses

Before Hobby Lobby, the consensus was that a business owner should keep
his religion outside of the marketplace.181 Hobby Lobby radically changed that
paradigm. Hobby Lobby opened the door for religious businesses through
two important holdings. First, individuals have the right to exercise their
religion through a corporation.182 Second, the term “person,” as used in
RFRA, includes corporations, and therefore, a corporation could bring a
claim when a corporation and its owner’s free exercise of religion are
violated.183
Justice Alito described the relationship between the corporation and its
owners, stating:
[I]t is important to keep in mind that the purpose of this
fiction is to provide protection for human beings. A
corporation is simply a form of organization used by human
beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law
specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including
shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated
with a corporation in one way or another. When rights,
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726–27.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id. at 728–30.
Id. at 736.
Selznick, supra note 91, at 1353–57.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 706.
Id. at 706.
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whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these
people. For example, extending Fourth Amendment
protection to corporations protects the privacy interests of
employees and others associated with the company.
Protecting corporations from government seizure of their
property without just compensation protects all those who
have a stake in the corporations’ financial well-being. And
protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like
Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious
liberty of the humans who own and control those
companies.184
In establishing that a corporation has the right to exercise religion, the
Court analyzed whether the profit-seeking function of a corporation would
bar the corporation from the right to free exercise of religion.185 The Court
held that a for-profit corporation can exercise religion abandoning the
precedent that the profit aspect of a corporation bars it from any religious
exercise right.186 The Court acknowledged that many corporations have more
than a profit-maximizing purpose and seek to impact society.187 Additionally,
since non-profit corporations have a corporate form and have the right to
exercise religion, the Court saw no difference between a non-profit
corporation and a for-profit corporation in their right to exercise religion. 188
The Court also held that a for-profit corporation is a “person” under
RFRA and therefore qualifies to bring a RFRA action.189 Qualifying to bring
a RFRA action is important because “RFRA offer[s] broader protection than
the Free Exercise Clause to the religious employer”:190
By its name it purports to “restore” an era of a general, freeranging right of accommodation for conduct or inaction
associated with a religious belief. The Act expressly
repudiates Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith. In essence, it
treats any “religious practice” as the equivalent of a
fundamental liberty protected from government limitation
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. at 706–07.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 706–07.
Id. at 711–12.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 712.
Id. at 706–07.
Selznick, supra note 91, at 1378.
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by a balancing test borrowed from substantive due process.
Thus, the Act states that “[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless
the government does so “in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest;” and by “the least restrictive means.”
The “exercise of religion” is defined to include “any exercise
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief.” For example, a person might
belong to a religion that permits but does not compel
polygamy. As long as a practitioner can associate his or her
polygamy with a religious purpose (perhaps the fruitful
reproduction of the religious membership) or a religious
belief (perhaps that four people are a single marital union
before God), the practice is an exercise of religion.
Moreover, a person might be a member of an organized
religion or system of religious belief but hold a personal and
eccentric view or interpretation of the sect’s doctrine. A
Lutheran might firmly believe that Saturday work is sinful.
It makes no difference whether Lutheran doctrine
corroborates this view.191
Hobby Lobby was a monumental case for the religious business owner. It
acknowledged that an owner has religious exercise rights through his or her
corporation. The corporation also has the same religious exercise rights.
Now, based on those rights, the owner and the corporation can sue when
those rights are infringed upon by the government. Finally, the Court in
Hobby Lobby abandoned the idea that corporations cannot be designated as
religious because of their purpose of maximizing profit.
VI. THE INEVITABLE CLASH OF A RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER AND TITLE VII
POST-HOBBY LOBBY
The clash between a religious employer’s exercise of religion rights and the
bar against discrimination was inevitable. Currently, there is a four-way
circuit split regarding the section 702 exemption and the proper test to be
applied.192 Because the section 702 exemption prevents the federal
191

Richard Carlson, The Sincerely Religious Corporation, 19 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC.
WELFARE L. REV. 165, 178–79 (2018) (footnotes omitted).
192
Emily S. Fields, VII Divided by Four: The Four-Way Circuit Split over the Title VII
“Religious Organization” Exemption, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 55, 75–76, 82 (2017); see Fike v.
United Methodist Child’s Home of Va., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 286, 289–90 (E.D. Va. 1982) (The
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government from infringing on a person’s First Amendment rights, the
different section 702 exemption tests create unequal protections for an
individual’s First Amendment rights: “The consequence of this permissible
discrimination is an intrusion upon an individual's Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to equal protection of the laws, including a guarantee of
civil rights.”193 The gravity of correctly defining a religious corporation is
great because either the employee’s rights or the corporation’s and owner’s
rights will be infringed upon.
If the Supreme Court of the United States were to address the issue of
whether a for-profit, religious business can qualify for the section 702
exemption to Title VII, the Court would have two methods of analysis. The
first method of analysis would be to include a religious, for-profit corporation
in the definition of the section 702 exemption that applies to religious
corporations or associations. The second method of analysis would be to
determine whether a religious corporation would win in a RFRA claim. The
following sections apply these two methods of analysis. But first, since Hobby
Lobby referenced Title VII, those references must be addressed.
A.

Title VII Discussed in the Hobby Lobby Opinion

The Hobby Lobby Court briefly mentioned Title VII twice in its opinion.194
However, both instances were not clear and invite commentators to argue
over that portion of the opinion.195 Some commentators may argue that the
Title VII portions of the opinion were dicta, suggesting that RFRA should
not be used in a Title VII case.196 However, the Court’s comments were not
merely dicta, but rather an analysis of Title VII in its rationale for the
application of RFRA.197
1.

Excerpt One: Congress Speaks with Specificity

Commentators indirectly point to the following excerpt to argue that the
Court in Hobby Lobby held that a for-profit corporation cannot be a religious
Secularization Test), aff’d, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477,
484–85 (5th Cir. 1980) (The Sufficiently Religious Test); McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F.
Supp. 1100, 1101–02, 1104–06 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (same), aff'd, 460 F.2d 553, 561 (5th Cir.
1972); Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (The
Primarily Religious Test); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass'n, 503 F.3d 217, 226–
27, 229–30 (3d Cir. 2007) (The LeBoon Test).
193
Fields, supra note 192, at 76.
194
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 716–17, 733.
195
Id.
196
See Amanda Brennan, Playing Outside the Joints: Where the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Meets Title VII, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 569, 587, 593 (2018).
197
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 716–17.
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“corporation or association” within Title VII’s section 702 exemption.198
However, this is a misinterpretation of the opinion. The entire portion of the
case regarding Title VII states as follows:
Presumably in recognition of the weakness of this
argument,199 both HHS and the principal dissent fall back on
the broader contention that the Nation lacks a tradition of
exempting for-profit corporations from generally applicable
laws. By contrast, HHS contends, statutes like Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–19(A),200 expressly exempt churches and
other nonprofit religious institutions but not for-profit
corporations. See Brief for HHS in No. 13–356, p. 26. In
making this argument, however, HHS did not call to our
attention the fact that some federal statutes do exempt
categories of entities that include for-profit corporations
from laws that would otherwise require these entities to
engage in activities to which they object on grounds of
conscience. If Title VII and similar laws show anything, it is
that Congress speaks with specificity when it intends a
religious accommodation not to extend to for-profit
corporations.201
In an attempt to strengthen HHS’s argument that a for-profit corporation
cannot be a religious corporation, HHS argued that there was a presumption
that religious accommodations do not apply to for-profit companies.202 HHS
analogized to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(a), arguing that § 2000e–1(a)

198

See Carmella, supra note 15, at 425 (“The Court has been careful not to align
businesses with churches in the autonomy discourse and has been careful not to suggest that
a business is central to creating or reinforcing norms for a community of believers.”);
Carlson, supra note 191, at 194 (“A for-profit corporation that is not a “religious”
organization (and cannot be, because it is for profit) might be subject to heightened scrutiny
with respect to the sincerity of an asserted religious belief of its owners.”).
199
See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 713 (“HHS argues that RFRA did no more than codify
this Court’s pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause precedents, and because none of those cases
squarely held that a for-profit corporation has free-exercise rights, RFRA does not confer
such protection. This argument has many flaws.”).
200
Note, the Hobby Lobby opinion referenced “Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–19(A)” as the
law that HHS was arguing, but this was a typographical error, as the Court cited to
Respondent’s (HHS) brief where the Respondent argued regarding “2000e–1(a).” Id. at 716;
Brief for the Respondents at 26, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 572 U.S. 1011
(2014) (No. 13-356), 2014 LEXIS 538, at *47 [hereinafter Brief for HHS]).
201
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 716–17 (citation & footnote omitted).
202
Id. at 716; see Brief for HHS, supra note 200, at *47.
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does not apply to for-profit companies.203 HHS said that Congress excluded
for-profit corporations from the exemption because a for-profit company
cannot be religious.204 The Court said that HHS was incorrect.205 The
presumption is that there is an accommodation, even when the courts or
Congress are silent on the matter.206 That presumption stands unless
Congress specifically says otherwise.207 Congress did not specifically say
whether a for-profit corporation was excluded from the definition of
“religious organization or association” because Congress never defined that
term.208 Thus, in Hobby Lobby, the Court did not rule on whether § 2000e–
1(a) excludes for-profit companies.209 The Court only addressed HHS’s
incorrect use of the analogy.
2.

Excerpt Two: The Government’s Compelling Interest in
Title VII

In the last few paragraphs of the opinion, Justice Alito addressed several
of the dissent’s concerns. One objection was “that a ruling in favor of the
objecting parties in these cases will lead to a flood of religious objections
regarding a wide variety of medical procedures and drugs,” but Justice Alito
noted that “HHS has made no effort to substantiate this prediction.”210
Closely related to that idea was the dissent’s second concern, that RFRA
should not be used in a Title VII case, which is the main point that
commentators argue was just dicta. 211 The following is the full statement in
Justice Alito’s opinion:
The principal dissent raises the possibility that
discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race,
might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal
sanction. Our decision today provides no such shield. The
Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard

203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Brief for HHS, supra note 200.
Id.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 716–17.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 732.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 733.
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to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are
precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.212
Coupling Justice Alito’s comments with the following excerpt from the
dissent’s footnote to the opinion, provides a compelling argument that Hobby
Lobby settled the issue:
Typically, Congress has accorded to organizations
religious in character religion-based exemptions from
statutes of general application. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(a)
(Title VII exemption from prohibition against employment
discrimination based on religion for “a religious
corporation, association, educational institution, or society
with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular
religion to perform work connected with the carrying
on . . . of its activities”); 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(1) (parallel
exemption in Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990). It
can scarcely be maintained that RFRA enlarges these
exemptions to allow Hobby Lobby and Conestoga to hire
only persons who share the religious beliefs of the Greens or
Hahns. Nor does the Court suggest otherwise. . . .
The Court does identify two statutory exemptions it reads
to cover for-profit corporations, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a–7(b)(2)
and 238n(a), and infers from them that “Congress speaks
with specificity when it intends a religious accommodation
not to extend to for-profit corporations,” . . . The Court's
inference is unwarranted. The exemptions the Court cites
cover certain medical personnel who object to performing
or assisting with abortions. . . . Notably, the Court does not
assert that these exemptions have in fact been afforded to
for-profit corporations. These provisions are revealing in a
way that detracts from one of the Court's main arguments.
They show that Congress is not content to rest on the
Dictionary Act when it wishes to ensure that particular
entities are among those eligible for a religious
accommodation.
Moreover, the exemption codified in § 238n(a) was not
enacted until three years after RFRA’s passage. If, as the
Court believes, RFRA opened all statutory schemes to

212

Id. (citation omitted).

242

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:2

religion-based challenges by for-profit corporations, there
would be no need for a statute-specific, post-RFRA
exemption of this sort.213
The dissent argued that RFRA should not be applied to all statutory
schemes and specifically not to Title VII.214
In analyzing whether Hobby Lobby precluded a RFRA analysis for a Title
VII claim, one commentator suggested that “[t]he court [in Harris Funeral
Home215] did not read the Hobby Lobby dicta on Title VII—declaring that
Title VII serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored—as exempting
Title VII from the focused analysis RFRA demands.”216 The commentator
continues:
In an attempt to quell the dissent’s fears that its decision
will permit every corporation to become a law unto itself, the
majority rejected the possibility “that discrimination in
hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as
religious practice to escape legal sanction.” It reasoned that
the government has a compelling interest in providing equal
opportunity in the workforce, and Title VII’s prohibition on
racial discrimination is the least restrictive means to achieve
that goal.217
This commentator argued that the Hobby Lobby opinion contained dicta not
allowing RFRA to be applied to Title VII.
However, the Harris Funeral Home district court rejected the views of the
commentators. Rather, Harris Funeral Home interpreted Hobby Lobby as
follows:
This Court does not read that paragraph as indicating that a
RFRA defense can never prevail as a defense to Title VII or
that Title VII is exempt from the focused analysis set forth
by the majority. If that were the case, the majority would
presumably have said so. It did not.
213

Id. at 753 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (some citations omitted).
Id.
215
See infra Section VI.D; EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d
560, 581 (6th Cir. 2018) (determining whether requiring employer to comply with Title VII
satisfied EEOC’s compelling interest in eliminating workplace discrimination and the
compliance did not substantially burden his religious practice of operating funeral homes),
aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
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....
Without any authority to indicate that Title VII is exempted
from the analysis set forth in Hobby Lobby, this Court
concludes that it must be applied here.218
Similar to Excerpt One, commentators argued that Hobby Lobby
contained dicta which suggested that RFRA could never be applied to a Title
VII issue.219 That is not a proper interpretation. Similar to Harris Funeral
Home, Hobby Lobby did not exempt a RFRA defense to Title VII.220 Title VII
was not even the issue in Hobby Lobby. Each time Title VII was mentioned
by the majority in Hobby Lobby, it was simply in passing and was not
thoroughly analyzed.221 Therefore, Hobby Lobby does not bar a RFRA defense
for a Title VII claim.
B.

Redefining “religious corporation or association” using the Townley
Test

Townley is one of the first cases that addressed whether a for-profit
corporation could qualify for the section 702 exemption. The main factor
referred to by the Townley court, and other courts after Townley, was the forprofit distinction. While the court in Townley analyzed whether the
corporation is for-profit as simply a factor, the for-profit status has developed
into a functional categorical rule that bars for-profit corporations from
qualifying for the section 702 exemption.222 When analyzing whether an
organization qualifies for the exemption, the first question is whether it is
for-profit.223 If it is, then the case is dismissed;224 if not, then the court will
continue its analysis. Courts reason that the faith of a business owner does
not have a place in the marketplace by leaning on the separation of church
and commerce doctrine.225

218

EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 857–58 (E.D.
Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020).
219
See supra Section VI.A.1.
220
See Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 857–58; Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 733.
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See id. at 716; EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618–19 (9th Cir.
1988); Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 734–35 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, C.J.,
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Following its mention of the separation of church and commerce doctrine,
the court in Townley held that each case “turn[s] on its own facts” and “[a]ll
significant religious and secular characteristics must be weighed to determine
whether the corporation’s purpose and character are primarily religious.
Only when that is the case will the corporation be able to avail itself of the
exemption.”226 As noted above, while the Townley court held the
determination for the exemption is case-by-case and certain factors must be
weighed, the for-profit status is a categorical bar.227 This means that, instead
of being a factor, the for-profit status is a bar from the section 702 exemption.
The Townley court then laid out the test for whether a corporation is
“primarily religious.”228 The court bifurcated the different factors into those
that lean in favor of an organization being secular, and those that lean in favor
of an organization being religious. The factors were listed and bifurcated as
follows:
Secular
1) the organization is for-profit;
2) the organization produces a secular product;
3) the organization is not affiliated with or supported by a church;
and
4) the organization’s articles of incorporation mention a religious
purpose.
Religious
1) the organization’s marketing includes a religious message;
2) the organization financially supports a religious organization;
3) the organization conducts weekly devotional services; and
4) the organization’s owner is a person of faith.229
After Hobby Lobby, the Townley factors leaned in favor of a for-profit
corporation being included in the definition of a “religious corporation or
association.” Regarding secular factor three—“not affiliated with or
supported by a church”230—as business owners, the Hahn and Green families
both gave from their profits to church-related activities.231 As active members
of their respective churches, they attempted to run their businesses in a way
that honored the Lord in accordance with the faith of their church, and this
226
227
228
229
230
231

Townley, 859 F.2d at 618.
Id.
Id. at 619.
See id.
Id.
Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 703.
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was sufficient to satisfy the affiliation with a church factor.232 Using the
Hypothetical Businesses, Yosef hired students from the synagogue. Yosef also
donated his profits to a Jewish community center that was connected with
his synagogue. These facts show how a business owner can also satisfy the
third factor.
In Hobby Lobby, Justice Samuel Alito, spoke directly to Townley’s fourth
factor, the founding documents stating a religious purpose,233 in mentioning
the benefit corporation.234 Benefit corporations have a specific purpose other
than profit-maximization, which can include a religious purpose.235 Limited
Liability Companies can also be formed for any specific purpose in their
articles of organization.236 Religious elements, such as a member holding to
certain doctrines of faith, can be added to the operating agreement of the
LLC.237 Thus, a religious purpose can easily be incorporated in the founding
documents of a for-profit organization. As illustrated, a for-profit
corporation can meet the fourth factor of the Townley test in various ways.
The second factor, whether the organization produces a secular product,238
is a little more difficult to handle. The second factor derives from the
separation of church and commerce doctrine.239 However, both the Greens
and the Hahns sold secular products.240 The Court did not even mention this
distinction in Hobby Lobby.241 The Court was more concerned with the
religious liberties of the business owner than whether the business sold a
religious product.242 Therefore, whether the corporation sells a secular
product may not have as much weight in the analysis as some of the other
factors.243
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Townley, 859 F.2d at 619.
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Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 712.
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Id. at 712–13.
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VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1–1008 (“Every limited liability company formed under this
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The final, and arguably the most important factor, is that the corporation
is for-profit. As previously discussed, courts have construed this factor to be
a categorical rule, indicating that a for-profit corporation can never be
religious.244 The question at hand is whether Hobby Lobby has changed that
rule and indicated that a corporation can be religious. Hobby Lobby held that
a corporation has the right to free exercise of religion.245 Does that mean that
the corporation is religious? A better question may be: do the religious rights
of the corporation’s owner flow through the corporation to make that
corporation inherently religious? If the corporation is not inherently
religious, should the corporation still be defined as religious because of the
flow of the owner’s rights? This article argues that the for-profit corporation
can be defined as religious pursuant to the section 702 exemption to Title VII.
In The Sincerely Religious Corporation, Richard Carlson attempted to
address whether, after Hobby Lobby, a for-profit corporation can exercise
religion and be religious.246 One of the examples Carlson used was the section
702 exemption.247 Carlson concluded that a for-profit corporation cannot be
religious.248
Carlson conceded that Hobby Lobby changed the precedent by allowing a
for-profit corporation to bring a RFRA claim.249 However, it seems Carlson
would argue that the RFRA claim is only based on the religious exercise rights
of the owner and not the corporation.250 Carlson supported these arguments
by quoting Justice Alito’s opinion, where Justice Alito explained that a
corporation is a legal fiction that protects the rights of the individual.251
Carlson stated the following from Justice Alito’s opinion in Hobby Lobby:
Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and
Greens by employing a familiar legal fiction: It included
corporations within RFRA’s definition of “persons.” But it is
important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is
to provide protection for human beings. A corporation is
simply a form of organization used by human beings to
achieve desired ends . . . . When rights, whether
244

See id. at 716; Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 733–35 (9th Cir. 2011);
EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615–16 (9th Cir. 1988).
245
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constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the
purpose is to protect the rights of these people.252
Carlson is correct in addressing the quote where Justice Alito points to the
purpose of protecting the rights of the owners. However, Justice Alito also
indicated that the free exercise right belongs to the company as well.253 In
determining whether the HHS mandate “substantially burden[ed]” the
exercise of religion, Justice Alito stated, “[b]y requiring the Hahns and
Greens and their companies to arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate
demands that they engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious
beliefs.”254 Here, Justice Alito referred to both the families and their
companies, indicating that both the families’ and companies’ freedom of
religious exercise was violated.
The distinction that the religious exercise right applies to a company, as
well as to its owner’s family, is important because it indicates that a for-profit
corporation has religious freedom rights. The question at hand is whether the
Court’s holding in Hobby Lobby also means that a for-profit corporation can
be religious.
Carlson would argue that Hobby Lobby did not change the meaning of
“religious corporation, organization, or association.”255 However, Carlson
does not give any reason for why the Court’s holding does not change the
analysis. He simply states that a for-profit corporation can never be
religious.256 One of Carlson’s statements does not have a footnote, nor a cite
to any reference.257 Another statement cites to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a).258
Carlson presumes that, based on the statute, a for-profit corporation can
never be religious. However, as noted above, the statute does not define a
“religious organization.”259 It is case law, and in particular Townley, that
barred a for-profit corporation from being defined as religious.260 However,
Hobby Lobby removed the for-profit bar for a RFRA action, which seriously
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calls into question the bar against defining a for-profit corporation as
religious.261
With a categorical bar to a for-profit corporation, the test Carlson would
propose for a religious organization is:
Whether an organization is religious depends on whether it
is religious by its organization and function. The sincerity of
the individuals who form the organization does not need
much evaluation for this purpose. None of these approaches
require that the membership or employees must be
homogenous in their religious beliefs. An organization
might serve, accept work, and open its facilities to persons of
other religions or no religion at all. What matters most are
the non-profit form, religious function and organization,
and religious expression to the outside world. Individual
sincerity is not a likely issue unless the organization might
be a complete sham. In this way, the objective legitimacy of
a non-profit organization’s claim of religiousness is
completely different from the subjective sincerity of an
individual's claim of a religious reason for a practice.
Evaluating a religious organization’s legitimacy does involve
some of the same dangers of entanglement found in the
adjudication of individual sincerity, but the dangers are
much less severe.262
By eliminating the for-profit bar, a for-profit organization could be a
religious organization as defined by Carlson. The organization would be
recognized as religious by forming with a religious purpose, implementing
policies that have a religious presupposition, and holding the company out
to the world as religious.
Carlson also makes the assertion that a corporation cannot be religious
because religious beliefs or faiths entail mental processes.263 Organizations do
not have mental processes; therefore, organizations cannot be religious.
Carlson also argued that organizations cannot be religious because, as Justice
Alito pointed out, corporations are the alter ego of the business owner.264 The
business owner’s religious freedom rights flow through the corporation.
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Therefore, Carlson would argue, this indicates that the rights are that of the
owner and not the corporation.265
Carlson is correct in that organizations do not believe in anything on their
own. However, how then can a non-profit be a religious corporation? The
non-profit also does not have mental processes. Rather, the religious
definition is derived from the organization of the entity and its function. As
mentioned above, a for-profit can be organized as and function as a religious
entity.266 Second, as addressed above, Justice Alito explained that the religious
exercise is not only that of the corporation’s owners, but it is also that of the
corporation itself.267
Why do religious freedom rights flow through the organization? Because
the owners have religious beliefs. Why would the beliefs of the owner also not
flow through the organization? Amazon just recently released a statement
regarding its policies and views on political and social issues.268 Are these
statements the actual beliefs of Amazon? Did Amazon conjure up these
beliefs on its own? No. It was the fiduciaries of the corporation that came
together and established the beliefs as a corporate body for Amazon. 269 The
beliefs of the individuals flow through the organization. Does that mean that
Amazon’s statements will not affect the organization? Arguably, no. These
statements drive Amazon to make certain choices regarding business
strategy, communication, marketing, CSR initiatives, and where to funnel
profits regarding corporate donations.
Very similar to the Amazon statements are the statements made by Hobby
Lobby, Conestoga, and Townley. These companies had statements of faith.
The statements reflected the position of the companies and the policies in
place to reflect those beliefs. Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Townley were
organized and functioned as religious entities.
The last argument in support of allowing a for-profit corporation to be
defined as religious is the demand shift in the marketplace. The bar to
religious for-profits seems to stem from the separation of church and
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commerce doctrine.270 But it also seems to stem from the doctrine that the
sole purpose for a corporation is profit-maximization. Much of corporate law
is based on that doctrine.271 For instance, a corporation’s fiduciary duties are
based on profit-maximization.272 The overall premise of a corporate fiduciary
is to maximize the profit for a shareholder.273 Therefore, a decision that is
opposed to maximizing shareholder value may be a breach of the fiduciary
duty.
However, there is a shift in the marketplace that demands maximizing
stakeholder value over shareholder value; this demand shift is manifested in
the thirty-three states that have adopted a benefit corporation model act.274
Under the act, a corporation may be formed for other purposes besides solely
maximizing shareholder wealth.275 The demand for benefit corporations and
CSR initiatives indicates that the market demands corporations to add value
to all internal and external stakeholders.276 The market demands something
more. In the religious context, the market demands business owners that live
their faith through their business and give to similar religious activities.
A for-profit corporation should not be barred from qualifying as a
religious organization under the section 702 exemption. Hobby Lobby held
that for-profit corporations have the right to exercise the company’s
religion.277 A corporation that exercises religion is proved religious by its
founding documents, policies, and practices, as well as by the corporation’s
marketing of its professed religion to the outside world. Therefore, the forprofit bar should no longer be a categorical bar; rather, it should be a factor
to consider.
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In conclusion, Hobby Lobby changed the Townley analysis for a for-profit
corporation. The four secular factors—1) the organization is for-profit, (2)
produces a secular product, (3) affiliation with or supported by a church, and
(4) founding documents mention a religious purpose—can still be used to
determine whether a for-profit corporation can be religious pursuant to the
section 702 exemption. However, the for-profit status is not a categorical
exemption; rather, it is just a factor. Therefore, some for-profit corporations
should be considered religious pursuant to the section 702 exemption.
C.

Title VII and RFRA

There is a second method a court could use to determine whether a forprofit, religious business would qualify for the section 702 exemption. The
court could analyze whether the corporation’s right to the free exercise of
religion was violated by not qualifying for the section 702 exemption.
Regarding RFRA, it is important to note that Hobby Lobby was decided in
2014; therefore, it is a recent avenue for religious corporations to protect their
rights as Hobby Lobby extended that claim to for-profit corporations.278
In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court seemed to encourage a
religious employer facing a Title VII lawsuit to assert a claim regarding the
corporation’s religious exercise rights.279 In Bostock, the Supreme Court
consolidated three cases to define the term “sex” in Title VII.280 The Court
held that sex discrimination under Title VII includes discrimination based
on the individual’s sexual orientation or gender identity.281 At the end of the
majority opinion, the Court noted that, because the employers did not raise
any religious exercise issues, those issues were for another case and a later
Court to decide.282 If an employer were to bring the issue before the Court,
the Court reasoned that a RFRA claim would be the proper action.283 Title
VII’s bar from discriminating against this new protected class will impact
religious employers’ religious exercise rights.
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Similar to Hobby Lobby, if a religious corporation were to bring a RFRA
action regarding qualifying for the section 702 exemption, the Court would
have to determine whether the government substantially burdened the
corporation’s exercise of religion, even if the burden resulted from a rule of
general applicability.284 To overcome the burden, the Government would
have to demonstrate that the application of the burden to the person: (1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.285 The
conclusion to this analysis will be contingent on the posture of the case and
who brought the RFRA defense.
D.

EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc.

One of the cases consolidated into Bostock was EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes, Inc.286 While the issues in the case and most of the
scholarship on the case revolve around the definition of “sex,” the balancing
of LGBT rights, and the issue of whether LGBT individuals are a protected
class, the case provides an excellent example for the two methods of analysis
presented in this article.287
Aimee Stephens was born biologically as a male; however, she decided to
transition from male to female.288 Aimee was fired from Harris Funeral
Homes because of her decision to transition to a female.289 Thomas Rost was
the majority owner of Harris Funeral Homes and was the owner that fired
Aimee.290 Rost testified that he fired Aimee because of her transition from
male to female.291
Rost is a devout Christian and seeks to honor the Lord through his closelyheld, for-profit corporation.292 Rost proclaims “that God has called him to
serve grieving people” and “that his purpose in life is to minister to the
grieving,” which is reflected in the company’s mission statement and on its
website.293 The company also places Bibles, “Daily Bread” devotionals, and
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“Jesus Cards” in public places throughout the funeral home.294 However, the
funeral home is not connected to a church, it does not display religious
figures so as to not offend any guests of different faiths, and Rost does not
discriminate when hiring based on religious beliefs.295
The EEOC filed a complaint against the Funeral Home claiming
discrimination against a protected class.296 The District Court of Michigan
ruled in favor of Rost and the funeral home.297 Despite direct evidence of
discrimination, the court found that “the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”) precludes the EEOC from enforcing Title VII against the Funeral
Home, as doing so would substantially burden Rost and the Funeral Home’s
religious exercise.”298 In addition, “the EEOC had failed to demonstrate that
enforcing Title VII was the least restrictive way to achieve its presumably
compelling interest ‘in ensuring that Stephens is not subject to gender
stereotypes in the workplace in terms of required clothing at the Funeral
home’”; and thus, the court held that “the EEOC could have achieved its goal
by proposing that the Funeral Home impose a gender-neutral dress code.”299
The Court of Appeals overruled the district court.300 Regarding the RFRA
analysis, the court held: (1) requiring the employer to comply with Title VII
did not substantially burden his religious practice of operating funeral
homes, precluding a RFRA defense to Title VII claims; (2) requiring the
employer to comply with Title VII satisfied EEOC’s compelling interest in
eliminating workplace discrimination, precluding a RFRA defense to Title
VII claims; and (3) requiring the employer to comply with Title VII was the
least restrictive way to further the EEOC’s interests, precluding a RFRA
defense to Title VII claims.301
A religious employer will have a hard time overcoming the government’s
compelling interest in eliminating workplace discrimination. This analysis
will ultimately boil down to each court’s decision. As seen in Harris Funeral
Homes, the district court held that the religious employers overcame the
government’s compelling interest.302 The Court of Appeals held it did not.303
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As noted above, when Harris Funeral Homes was consolidated in Bostock, the
RFRA claim was not brought before the Supreme Court.304
The Harris Funeral Homes case also presented an interesting issue
regarding redefining a religious corporation. Per an amicus brief, the Court
of Appeals analyzed whether Harris Funeral Homes would qualify for the
ministerial exception.305 As previously noted in Section III(B), a for-profit
corporation should not qualify for the ministerial exception. Instead of
attempting to qualify for the ministerial exception, Rost should have raised
an argument for redefining “religious corporation [or] association” pursuant
to the section 702 exemption.306
Harris Funeral Homes would fall squarely within the section 702
exemption. Harris Funeral Homes was a closely-held corporation with only
a few owners.307 The majority owner, owning 95.4% of the corporation, was
a Christian who sought to honor the Lord through his business.308 His
purpose was to minister to grieving people.309 Harris presented the
corporation as a Christian corporation by displaying scripture on printed
materials and verses on the website.310 Harris also had “Jesus Cards” in public
places around the funeral home.311 Harris did not have a religious purpose in
the business’s articles of incorporation; however, similar to the for-profit
factor, this is just one factor the court should consider.312 Asking the court to
redefine “religious corporation or association” may have won the day for
Rost and his closely-held, religious business.
In conclusion, the Court would have two methods to analyze whether a
for-profit, religious business would qualify for the section 702 exemption.
The first method of analysis would be including a religious, for-profit
corporation in the definition of the section 702 exemption that applies to
religious corporations or associations. The second method of analysis would
be arguing that a religious corporation would win in a RFRA claim.
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VII. PLANNING FOR THE RELIGIOUS BUSINESS OWNER
Moving from the litigation mindset to a planning mindset, there are
several points a religious business owner might consider. First, as the law
stands, courts have not included for-profit corporations in the definition of
a “religious corporation or association” pursuant to the section 702
exemption, and therefore, for-profit corporations do not qualify for the
section 702 exemption.313 Because a for-profit corporation cannot qualify for
the exemption, the business owner may consider keeping the business under
fifteen employees.314 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply until the
fifteenth employee is hired.315 Therefore, a business owner may discriminate
if there are fewer than fifteen employees.316
A religious business owner may take some additional steps in hopes that
the law changes. The goal of the religious business owner is to show that the
essence of the business cannot be separated from the religious purpose of the
business. The courts look to the organization and function of the business.317
In the organization of the business, the business owner should consider,
similar to the Greens and Hahns, a closely-held corporation or an LLC as the
chosen business entity.318 Both business entities are typically used when there
is a small number of owners. In the founding documents of the business, the
owner should state that the business is created for a specific religious purpose.
The founding document might also reference a document that contains the
statement of faith of the business and the business owners. In the bylaws of
the corporation or the operating agreement of the LLC, the business owner
should consider making ownership of the business conditioned on holding
the beliefs stated in the statement of faith. The documents could also state
that disaffirming the statement of faith could lead to the expulsion of
ownership rights in the company or a forced buy-out agreement.
313
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The business owner may also consider a benefit corporation. As previously
mentioned, the benefit corporation is designed for a specific purpose other
than shareholder value maximization.319 The other purpose, besides the
benefit of society, should be for a specific religious purpose. The business
owner may find this profitable because the fiduciary duties of the benefit
corporation will incorporate that specific religious purpose. Unlike a closelyheld corporation, where the courts may not be as persuaded that the
fiduciaries of the closely-held corporation may incorporate religious
purposes in their fiduciary duties. Similar to a benefit corporation, members
of an LLC may incorporate the religious purpose as part of their fiduciary
duties per the operating agreement.
The business owner should also carefully craft human resource policies
and procedures. These human resource policies and procedures should
reflect the business owner’s faith and how it manifests throughout the
business. Because the religious business will not currently qualify for the
section 702 exemption, the business owner may consider a position that will
qualify for a “bona fide occupation qualification” (“BFOQ”).320 Using the
Hypothetical Businesses, for instance, Yosef may consider making his server
position a BFOQ because the religious qualifications of the position include
talking with customers about the Jewish faith.321
Other human resource issues may arise that are similar to Townley’s
mandatory policy of paid devotion and worship services for all employees. In
these instances, the business owner must provide adequate accommodations
for employees who do not wish to participate in certain activities. The
business owner will have to further research the EEOC religious
accommodation compliance rules and case law.
Most of the courts noted the distribution of profits to religious activities
as a factor in determining whether the organization was religious.322 The
religious business owner should consider giving to religious organizations of
similar faith.323 Most courts also considered whether the business marketed
itself as a religious business.324 The business owner should attempt to
incorporate religious marketing elements through its marketing plan.325
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Finally, the business owner should stay true to the mission embodied in
the business’s founding documents. The business should not deviate from its
religious purpose, policies, or procedures. The courts will look for instances
where the business did not act in a way that is in accordance with the
founding documents.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The “for-profit” aspect of a business should not be a categorical bar from
the section 702 exemption. The original test from Townley considered factors
in the evaluation of a business. However, the “for-profit” factor has turned
into a bar from the exemption. This bar is an infringement on a business’s
First Amendment right to exercise religion. Hobby Lobby was a landmark
case that established that businesses do have a right to exercise religion. The
religious exercise right should be applied to Title VII and the section 702
exemption to allow a for-profit business to discriminate in employment
practices. Allowing for-profit businesses to use the exemption will meet the
cultural demand for religious CSR initiatives and return to the idea that
religion and the marketplace can operate seamlessly together.
From a business planning mindset, there are several points a religious
business owner might consider. First, as the law stands, courts have not
included for-profit corporations in the definition of a “religious corporation
or association” pursuant to the section 702 exemption, and therefore, such
corporations do not qualify for the section 702 exemption. Because a forprofit corporation cannot qualify for the exemption, the business owner may
consider keeping the business under fifteen employees. The Civil Rights Act
of 1964 does not apply until the fifteenth employee is hired.326 Therefore, a
business owner may discriminate if there are fewer than fifteen employees.327
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